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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JERRY LAWLEY,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent, ]
1

vs.
VALLEY FORD, INC., a Utah
corporation dba VALLEY
JAGUAR, DAVID G. BASTIAN,
an individual,

CASE NO. 87 0490 CA

]
]

Defendant-Appellant.

Brief of the Respondent
Jerry Lawley
Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a3(2)(h), 1953 (as amended).
Nature of the Proceedings
An appeal from default judgment entered by the Third
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Timothy Hanson, in
favor of the Respondent, Jerry Lawley and against the
Appellant, Valley Ford, Inc.
Determinative Statues
Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(Attached following brief.)
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Statement of the Case
Respondent, Jerry Lawley, filed suit in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, against
Appellant, Valley Ford, Inc., and David Bastian, seeking to
rescind a contract for the purchase of a Jaguar automobile
purchased from Valley Ford, Inc., (dba Valley Jaguar) and for
additional damages, including damages for fraud, on the part
of Valley Ford, Inc., and/or its employees, incurred in
connection with the sale.

Facts relevant to the issue on

appeal are as follows:
1.

Valley Ford, Inc. was served with Plaintiff-

Respondents Summons and Complaint on June 30, 1986.

Service

was accomplished by personal service upon Mr. Bryce Wade,
Valley Ford, Inc.'s registered agent.

(R.10).

attorney and member of the Utah State Bar.
2.

Mr. Wade is an

(R.14).

There having been no Answer, nor other

appropriate response to the Summons and Complaint filed by
Plaintiff-Respondent upon Defendant-Appellant, and the time
for answering having expired, the Default of DefendantAppellant was entered on July 22, 1986.
3.

(R.12).

Although Defendant-Respondent's registered agent

and attorney allegedly attempted to contact PlaintiffRespondent's attorney to discuss matters concerning the case,
he admitted that there was in fact no contact between himself
and Plaintiff-Respondent's attorney until after entry of
2

Default.

(R.15)
4.

Defendant-Appellant's registered agentf s

allegation that he had left "numerous" messages with
Plaintiff-Respondent's attorney prior to the entry of Default
was contradicted by the Affidavit of Claudette Mathie,
secretary to Respondent's attorney, which Affidavit indicated
that a review of the phone message records kept at the offices
of Plaintiff-Respondent's attorney showed no messages were
received from Defendant-Appellant's registered agent-attorney
until the date of the entry of default.
5.

(R.33-35).

After a period of attempts for a negotiated

settlement, Defendant-Appellant moved the Third District Court
to set aside Default, which Motion following a full hearing
was denied.

(R.37-39).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court's refusal to set aside the Default
of Respondent, Valley Ford, Inc., was a reasonable exercise of
that court's discretion, based upon the Defendant's failure to
meet its burden to show due diligence in preserving its
rights, and based upon its further failure to show reasonable
justification or excuse within the meaning of Rule 60(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT
A. THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The argument portion of appellant's brief correctly
sets before the Court the law concerning the general issue of
3

abuse of discretion by a trial court in refusing to set aside
a default.

However, Appellant misses the mark in applying the

law to the facts of the instant case.

Each authority cited by

Appellant requires that "reasonable justification or excuse"
be found in the actions of the party seeking to set aside the
default prior to a finding by the reviewing court that the
failure to set aside a default is an abuse of the authority.
(See e.g. Olson v. Cummingsf 565 P2d 1123, (Utah 1977) cited
in Appellant's brief at Page 7), and that trial courts are
endowed with discretion in deciding whether or not "reasonable
justification or excuse" exists in the specific set of facts
before it.

Carman v. Slavens, 546 P2d 601 (Utah 1976.)

In light of the fact that the determination of
"reasonable justification or excuse" will depend upon
particular fact situations before the trial court, it is not
difficult to comprehend that differing opinions or results
might be reached based on the specific facts before the court.
However, once the trial court has exercised its discretion,
that exercise of discretion will not be interfered with by the
reviewing court unless it is clearly shown that the trial
court acted arbitrarily and an abuse of discretion is clearly
shown.

Russell v. Martell, 681 P2d 1193 (Utah 1984).

also, Olson and Carmanf supra.

See

The question is not whether

the reviewing court agrees with the result reached by the
court below, but whether an actual abuse" of the discretion of
the trial court has occurred.
4

In defining abuse of discretion, C.J.S. Appeal and
Error, Section 1583 states:
"A reviewing court is never justified in
substituting its discretion for that of
the trial court; in determining whether
the lower court has abused its discretion,
the question is not whether the reviewing
court agrees with the court below, but,
rather, whether it believes that a
judicial mind, in view of the relevant
rules of law applicable to the particular
case and on due consideration of all the
circumstances could reasonably have
reached the conclusion of the court below,
of which complaint is made. The mere fact
that the appellate court would have
decided otherwise does not establish that
the discretion has been abused..."
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed its
adherence to the general principal stated above.

In Airkem

Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973),
the Court stated:
"The rule that the courts will incline
towards granting relief to a party, who
has not had the opportunity to present his
case, is ordinarily applied at the trial
level, and this court will not reverse the
determination of the trial court merely
because the motion could have been
granted."
More recently, the Court reiterated this principal
in Katz v. Pierce, 732 P2d 92 (Utah 1986), wherein the Court
stated:
"That some basis may exist to set aside
the default does not require the
conclusion that the Court abused its
discretion in refusing to do so when the
facts and circumstances support the
refusal.
The reviewing court's duty is to review the record
5

for evidence that the trial court's reasoning was sound.

The

mere argument that a reason existed at the trial court level
for the granting of the motion, and the court chose not to do
so based on the facts and evidence before it does not amount
to a showing of abuse of discretion.

"Abuse" goes into the

realm of the unreasonable, the illogical, the arbitrary or
capricious.
In the instant case, the trial court had before it
the arguments of the parties, and the affidavits in the
record.

Based upon all of the information it had, that court

determined that "reasonable justification or excuse" for
Appellant-Defendantfs failure to respond did not exist.

Such

determination was a reasonable exercise of the discretion of
the trial court, not an abuse as suggested by the Appellant.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD ACCEPT THE
INTERPRETATION BY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
THE HEARING ON THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT.
It is noteworthy that there is no transcript of the
proceedings before the trial court on Appellant's Motion to
Set Aside Default.

Inasmuch as Appellant's Motion below was

based exclusively upon arguments regarding factual matters,
the reviewing court may rely upon the judgment of the court
below, and that courtfs determination as to the weight and
credibility to be given to the arguments presented by the
parties.

As noted in Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P2d 607, 608

(Utah 1976) :
"Appellate review of factual matters can
be meaningful, orderly and intelligent
6

only in juxtaposition to a record by which
lower courts1 rulings and decisions on
disputes can be measured. In this case,
without a transcript, no such record was
available, and therefore, no measurement
of the court•s actions may be urged upon
us by Defendant."
. . . (U)nder elementary principals of appellate
review we:". . . presume the findings of the court
to have been supported by admissable, competent
substantial evidence . . . "
In the absence of the record below, the Court of
Appeals is justified in accepting the interpretation made by
the trial court of the facts, arguments, and evidence before
it.

This statement of the law was reaffirmed in Fackrell v.

Fackrell, 740 P2d 1318 (Utah 1987), and adopted and applied by
the Court of Appeals in Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P2d 238 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).
The court below, as noted, had before it the
arguments and supporting evidence offered of the parties, and
rather than finding reasonable justification or excuse, found
that a member of the Utah State Bar, acquainted with the
requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

was

personally served with a Summons and Complaint and failed to
file a timely response.

The affidavit of Appellant's

registered agent-attorney (R. 14-16) admits each of these
elements and likewise admits that he, in fact, had no contact
with Respondent's attorney until after the entry of default.
There simply was no reasonable justification or excuse for
Appellant's omissions.

7

C. THE PRIMARY CASES RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT TO
RAISE THE ACTIONS OF ITS REGISTERED AGENT-ATTORNEY TO THE
LEVEL OF "EXCUSABLE NEGLECT" ARE READILY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM
THE INSTANT CASE.
In Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P2d 1079 (Utah
1981) the Supreme Court overturned the trial court's refusal
to set aside a default judgment in a case where active
negotiations between the opposing parties occurred following
the service of a Summons and Complaint and prior to the entry
of Default.

The parties in Helgesen were in actual contact,

and the Court found a justifiable expectation of an
opportunity to respond on the part of the lay Defendant, who
was not represented by counsel, and who had been promised that
information and documentation would be provided by the
Plaintiff, but information which was not provided prior to the
entry of Default.
In the case presented for review, by contrast,
Appellant admits that no contact occurred between the parties
following the service of the Summons and Complaint prior to
the entry of Default.

Even assuming arguendo, the accuracy of

Appellant's assertion that its registered agent-attorney
attempted to contact Respondent's counsel, there is nothing to
justify an expectation on the part of the Appellant that such
"attempts" negated its responsibility to file a timely answer.
And while the Helgesen court suggested that certain facts and
circumstances may justify a reliance upon what Appellant
characterizes as "common professional courtesy", the facts in
the instant case simply do not rise to that level.
8

It is

patently unreasonable to expect such standards to be applied,
and an automatic extension granted, when no request nor even
any contact has been made.
Common experience indicates that "professional
courtesy" regarding enlargement of time for response is
commonly extended when a request has been made.

However,

following the entry of a Default, the fact of which has
communicated to counsel's client, expectations concerning
individual notions of professional courtesy cannot overcome
counsel's duty of loyalty to that attorney's own client, nor
will they justify actions inconsistent with the interests of
that client, particularly when the client has specifically
instructed a particular, and legal, course of action.
In Katz v. Piercef supra, the reviewing court found
no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in
refusing a defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default.

Once

again in Katz, actual contact between the parties occurred
subsequent to the service of the Summons and Complaint and
prior to the entry of default.

The court held that if the

party seeking to set aside the default had desired additional
time in which to present its defenses, it could have obtained
the same by a simple request.

In Katz, as in the instant

case, the Defendant was represented by an attorney acquainted
with the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Katz court noted that Plaintiff's counsel had
informed Defendant that a timely answer was expected failing
9

which, default would be obtained.

This notification in excess

of that contained in the Summons served upon the Defendant was
an exercise of "professional courtesy", to be sure, however,
it was significant only within the specific facts of Katz.
Once again, the clear distinction between Katz and the matter
for review is the lack of any contact between the parties.
D. APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO ACT TO PRESERVE ITS
RIGHTS, BASED UPON ITS ALLEGED ASSUMPTIONS, DOES NOT RISE TO
THE LEVEL OF REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUSE. APPELLANT
DID NOT EXERCISE ITS AFFIRMATIVE DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE TO
PRESERVE IT'S RIGHTS.
What is evident in the instant case is that
Appellant has failed to meet its obligation to demonstrate
that its actions should fall within the protections of Rule
60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in determining the
reasonableness of the conduct.

A reviewing court will look to

see whether "due diligence" was exercised by the party to
protect the party's rights.

In Airkem, supra, the Court

articulated the moving party's duty:
"The movant must show that he used due
diligence and that he was prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which he
had no control. (Emphasis in original) Id
at 431.
Additional language to that same effect is contained
in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Companyf 260 P2d 741, 743 (Utah
1953).
Surely Appellant did not meet its burden of due
diligence (all that was required was that an answer be filed
and actual contact be made), and/or circumstances beyond its
10

control.

The requirement of due diligence is an affirmative

duty, and a standard to which the actions of Appellant simply
do not attain.

While it may be common professional courtesy

to grant additional time to respond when requested, it is
likewise common professional practice to file even a minimally
sufficient Answer or other response, in order to preserve
rights, when contact cannot be made with opposing counsel in
order to request an extension.
counts:

Appellant failed on both

no request was made, and no effort to file even a

superficial response was attempted.

In short, the affirmative

duty of Appellant to act with due diligence was not met.
E. THE KNOWLEDGE THAT MATTERS ARE IN DISPUTE WILL
NOT JUSTIFY INACTION BY APPELLANT, NOR WILL IT REQUIRE
EXTRAORDINARY ACTION BY RESPONDENT.
Appellant's Brief attempts to advance the notion
that the purported assumptions of its registered agentattorney regarding the availability of an extension of time
for answer is justified based upon supposed knowledge by
Respondent's counsel that the issues in the case were
disputed, and that an answer should be expected.

Such

reasoning simply does not follow.
It would not be unreasonable to assume in every case
filed in any court of this state that the issues of those
cases are in dispute.

Were there no dispute, there would be

no purpose for the filing.

It would likewise not be

unreasonable to assume that an Answer or other response, would
be forthcoming in every case.
11

There must be more, as for

example was present in Katz, supra, to justify a failure to
act in response to a Summons, or to require additional action
by the author of a Summons, than the bare knowledge that
issues are in dispute.
There were no ongoing settlement negotiations at
the time of, nor were there any prior to, the filing of the
Complaint in the instant case.

There was no active

communication between the parties.

The facts are that

Plaintiff caused Defendant to be served with a Summons and
Complaint which stated the allegations of the Plaintiff
against Defendant.

The Summons clearly stated that an answer

was required within twenty (20) days of service of the Summons
upon Defendant, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and further clearly stated what the result of a
failure to respond within the indicated time frame would be:
the entry of default judgment for the relief demanded in the
Complaint.

Those facts lay the responsibility for action

squarely upon the Appellant, not upon Plaintiff's counsel.
Nothing in the law, nor in supposed expectations
concerning "common professional courtesy", requires
Plaintiff's counsel to act in a manner or course contrary to
that taken.

Appellant admits it was represented by counsel

upon whom personal service was accomplished, it was not
incumbent upon Plaintiff's counsel to advise Defendant,
particularly when the Summons clearly stated the intentions of
the Plaintiff.
12

F.

RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS COSTS ON APPEAL•
The instant case is appropriate for an award of

attorney's fees and costs on appeal to Plaintiff-Respondent,
consistent with the determination of the Court of Appeals in
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P2d 306 (Utah Ct. App 1987), wherein the
Court applied Rule 33(a), Rules of Appellate Procedure, to
award attorney's fees to the Respondent based upon an appeal
taken under the Rules which was frivolous or for the purpose
of delay.

Such is clearly the case in this action.

The law

governing the matter is well settled, no abuse by the trial
court has been shown, and the facts and evidence justifying
the actions of the trial court are undisputed.
The appeal is frivolous and intended only to delay
Respondent's recovery.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Respondent, Jerry
Lawley, respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals uphold
the refusal of the court below to set aside the Default of
Defendant, and affirm the Judgment awarded Plaintiff.
Additionally, Respondent requests that he be awarded his costs
on appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees, and such
other relief as the court deems proper.

13

DATED this

day of February, 1988•

Lloyd C. Eldredge
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Brief of
Respondent, Jerry Lawley, to the following:

Paul H. Van Dyke,

Elggren & Van Dyke, Attorney for Appellant, 444 South State,
Suite 201, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

day of

February, 1988.

Lloyd C. Eldredge
Attorney for Respondent

Id lawlford.bri
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Rule 55

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

research under 28 USCS § 1920 or Rule 54(d),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A L.R.
Fed. 168.

Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 24 to
135; Costs •» 78 et seq., 195 et seq., 221 et seq
Judgment •» 1.

Rule 55. Default.
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his
default.
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the
nondefaulting party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of
the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs against
the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is
not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account
or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter,
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems
necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this
rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff,
a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule
54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the State of Utah or against an
officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to
relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.)

162

Rule 60.

Relief from Judgment or Order

(a) Clerical Mistakes, Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders
or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its
own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice,
if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal,
such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed
in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms
as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed
to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than
3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
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